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I. Introduction
In the relevant time period of this update, there were three Colorado
Supreme Court cases, and one Colorado appellate court case, that
significantly impact the oil and gas industry and the same are discussed in
detail herein. Two such cases focus on permissible deductions: BP America
Production Co. v. Colorado Department of Revenue 1 discussed whether oil
and gas companies may claim severance tax deductions for cost of capital
associated with natural gas processing and transportation, and Lindauer v.
Williams Production Rocky Mountain Company 2 discussed whether lessees
may deduct the costs of transporting gas to downstream markets from
royalty payments. The two remaining cases pertain to local bans on
hydraulic fracturing. City of Longmont v. Colorado Oil and Gas
Association3 and City of Fort Collins v. Colorado Oil and Gas Association 4
are two companion cases that each discussed whether the Oil and Gas
Conservation Act preempts local bans and moratoriums on hydraulic
fracturing (referred to herein as “fracking”). Additionally, three other cases
are briefly mentioned in the “Additional Case Summaries” subsection:
1.
2.
3.
4.

2016 CO 23, 369 P.3d 281; see also Colorado, 1 Tex. A&M L. Rev. 129 (2014).
2016 COA 39.
2016 CO 29, 369 P.3d 573.
2016 CO 28, 369 P.3d 586.
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Rocky Mtn. Expl., Inc. v. Davis Graham and Stubbs LLP; 5 Owens v.
Tergeson;6 and Kinder Morgan CO2 Co., L.P. v. Motezuma County Board
of Commissioners. 7
Six bills intended to materially affect the oil and gas industry were also
proposed in the legislative session during the update period for this article.
Of these six bills, only one was passed and it has no adverse effects on oil
and gas operations. Specifically, Senate Bill 16-218 made certain
amendments and additions to, inter alia, Colorado’s severance tax statute
pertaining to refunds and the allocation of revenues held in certain funds. 8
Further, as a result of recommendations to the Governor made by
Colorado’s Oil and Gas Task Force various regulatory updates occurred
during the relevant update period. Pursuant to Recommendations #17 and
#20, as discussed in further detail below, the 100, 300 and 600 Series of
Rules for the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission were
amended to “define Large Facilities within Urban Mitigation Areas
(“UMA”), outline an enhanced local government consultation process when
siting Large UMA facilities, and include registration with local
governments to promote increased communication and advance planning.” 9
Lastly, four Ballot initiatives were proposed for inclusion on the
November 2016 ballot that would adversely affect the oil and gas industry.
But it now appears none of these Ballot initiatives, being #40, #63, #75 and
#78, will actually appear on the November 2016 ballot; 10 however, their
key objectives are outlined herein.
5. 2016 COA 33 (“[A] petition for rehearing in the court of appeals or a petition for
certiorari in the supreme court may be pending.”).
6. 2015 COA 164, 363 P.3d 826 (Colo.App. 2015).
7. No. 15SC595, 2016 WL 768449 (Colo. 2016).
8. S.B. 16-218, 70th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2016) (responding to the
Supreme Court Ruling in BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Colo. Dep’t of Revenue).
9. COGCC Oil and Gas Task Force Rulemaking Summary, Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n.,
http://www.coga.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/COGCC-Oil-Gas-TF-RulemakingSummary-Whitepaper.pdf.
10. Titles and petition formats were approved for Ballot Initiatives #40 (Local
Governance), #63 (Right to Healthy Environment), #75 (Local Government Authority to
Regulate Oil and Gas Development) and #78 (Mandatory Setback for Oil and Gas
Development) during the spring of 2016. But signatures were only submitted to the Colorado
Secretary of State on August 8, 2016, for Ballot Initiatives #75 and #78. On August 29,
2016, the Colorado Secretary of State announced that, based on the required random
sampling by state officials, it appears the required number of signatures have not been timely
filed to place either Ballot Initiative #75 or #78 on the November ballot. Registered voters
may challenge the Secretary of State’s determination by filing an action in Denver District
Court on or before September 28, 2016. See 2015-2016 Proposed Initiatives,
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II. Case Law
A. Permissible Deductions
Two cases were decided during this update period addressed what costs
may be claimed as deductions (1) under Colorado’s severance tax statute
and (2) from royalty payments due under an oil and gas lease. Both cases
are discussed in detail below.
1. Cost of Capital as Deduction under Severance Tax Statute
In BP America Production Co. v. Colorado Department of Revenue, the
Colorado Supreme Court considered the question of whether Colorado’s
severance tax statute, codified at Colorado Revised Statutes (“C.R.S.”) §
39-29-101, et. seq., permits the deduction of the “cost of capital” associated
with natural gas transportation and processing facilities. 11 The court
ultimately found that the plain language of the statute unambiguously
authorizes the deduction of such “cost of capital” and reversed the Court of
Appeals’ holding. 12
Income that is generated from the extraction of non-renewable resources
from the ground in Colorado is taxed under the above referenced statute.
The severance tax statute permits taxpayers to deduct “‘any transportation,
manufacturing, and processing costs borne by the taxpayer.” 13 The goal of
the severance tax is to tax the value of the resource at the time it is
extracted, referred to as the “wellhead value.” 14 Because resources are not
sold at the wellhead, it is necessary to “look back and calculate a resource’s
wellhead value after it has been processed, transported, and sold”; this lookback calculation is generally known as the “netback approach” and results
in the taxpayer being taxed only on the resource’s wellhead value rather
than its full sale price. 15
“Cost of capital” is generally defined as “the amount of money that an
investor could have earned on a different investment in a similar risk.” 16 “In
this case, the cost of capital is the amount of money that BP America
Production Company’s (“BP”) predecessors could have earned had they
http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/Initiatives/titleBoard.index.html (last visited Sept.
1, 2016).
11. 2016 CO 23, ¶ 1, 369 P.3d 281, 282.
12. Id.¶ 2, 369 P.3d at 283.
13. Id. ¶ 2 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-29-102(3)(a)).
14. Id. ¶ 11, 369 P.3d at 284.
15. Id. ¶¶ 11-12, 369 P.3d at 284-85.
16. Id. ¶ 1, 369 P.3d at 282 (internal citation omitted).
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invested in other ventures rather than in building transportation and
processing facilities.” 17 Specifically, such “cost of capital” is “the
difference between the amount of cost recovery that the predecessors
actually received from constructing the facilities, and the amount of cost
recovery or deductions that the predecessors could have received if they
had invested in existing facilities or paid a third party.” 18 The actual amount
of the BP’s “cost of capital” is not disputed as the parties stipulated to the
amount; however, the issue on appeal was whether such amount qualifies as
a “transportation, manufacturing and processing cost” under the severance
tax statute. 19
In considering this question, the court reviewed the language of the
statute to determine whether it is ambiguous and examined the meaning of
“costs” under said statute and whether “cost of capital” is included therein.
When interpreting a statute, the court’s goal is to give effect to the
legislative intent by first giving the words used in the statute their “ordinary
and commonly accepted meaning.” 20 In the case of construing a tax statute,
generally all doubts will be construed in favor of the taxpayer; however,
“‘deductions and exemptions in taxation are recorded as a matter of
legislative grace … and they are not allowed unless clearly provided
for.’” 21 The court found that Colorado’s severance tax statute is
unambiguous in allowing the deduction of “all transportation,
manufacturing and processing costs.” 22 It distinguished many cases relied
upon by the Court of Appeals in reaching its contrary decision by
highlighting that such cases interpreted the term “cost” or “costs” on its
own, without the preceding modifier of “any,” stating that “omitting the
adjective ‘any’ changes the context of the word ‘costs’” 23 and “‘when used
as an adjective in a statute, the word ‘any’ means ‘all.’” 24

17. Id.
18. Id. ¶ 23, 369 P.3d at 287.
19. Id. The District Court ruled that such cost of capital was a permissible deduction
because the severance tax statute allows for the deduction of “any” costs, and absent
language to the contrary, cost of capital is included within such parameters. The Court of
Appeals reserved, finding that the severance tax statute was ambiguous as to the meaning of
“costs,” and in the absence of express language from the legislature, costs of capital are not
deductible. Id. at ¶¶ 6-7, 369 P.3d at 284-85.
20. Id. ¶ 15, 369 P.3d at 285.
21. Id. ¶ 15, 369 P.3d at 285(internal citations omitted).
22. Id. ¶ 18, 369 P.3d at 286 (emphasis added).
23. Id. ¶ 17, 369 P.3d at 286.
24. Id. ¶ 18, 369 P.3d at 286 (internal citations omitted).
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The court also found that “cost of capital” was a covered “cost” under
the severance tax statute. The Department’s argument that “the cost of
capital is not an actual cost; instead, it is a mere ‘benefit forgone to pursue a
different opportunity’” 25 was rejected based upon the plain language of the
statute. 26 Additionally, the court identified other authorities which have
determined that “cost of capital” is in fact a “cost.” For example, the tax
statute governing oil and gas leaseholds states that the value of such lands is
calculated by deducting “gathering, transportation, manufacturing and
processing costs” pursuant to the administrator’s guidelines, 27 and the
guidelines established under that statute provide that “the cost of capital,
identified as ‘return on investment,’ is a deductible cost in valuing oil and
gas resources.” 28 Additionally, “the Tenth Circuit has held that, absent a
lease provision to the contrary, oil and gas lessees can deduct the cost of
capital attributable to transportation facilities” from royalty payments. 29 As
a result of this holding, companies that own facilities used for
manufacturing, transporting, and processing of oil and gas may deduct their
“cost of capital” from severance taxes.
2. Downstream Market Transportation Costs as Deduction from Royalty
Payments
The opinion in Lindauer v. Williams Production RMT Company 30
materially affects the oil and gas industry in Colorado. This case addressed
two issues which were previously undecided in Colorado, framed by the
court as follows:
First, must costs incurred to transport natural gas to markets
beyond the first commercial market “enhance” the value of that
gas, such that the actual royalty revenues increase, in order to be
deductible from royalty payments? Second, if the enhancement
test applies to such transportation costs, must the enhancement,

25. Id. ¶ 24, 369 P.3d at 287.
26. Id. ¶ 25, 369 P.3d at 287.
27. Id. ¶ 26, 369 P.3d at 288 (citing to COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-7-101(1)(d)).
28. Id. (citing 3 Assessors’ Reference Library, § VI at 6.44 (rev. Jan. 2016)).
29. Id. ¶ 27, 369 P.3d at 288 (citing Atl. Richfield Co. v. Farm Credit Bank of Wichita,
226 F.3d 1138, 1154 (10th Cir. 2000)).
30. 2016 COA 39 (“[A] petition for rehearing in the Court of Appeals or a petition for
Certiorari in the Supreme Court may be pending.”).
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and the reasonableness of the costs, be shown on a month by
month basis? 31
The court answered the first question in the negative, and therefore, did
not opine on the second. 32
This case involved a class action suit against WPX Energy Rocky
Mountain, LLC (“WPX”), with plaintiffs being royalty owners under oil
and gas leases covering lands in the Piceance Basin. 33 Each of the
plaintiff’s leases was silent as to the allocation of transportation costs. 34 The
parties stipulated that transportation costs incurred with moving the
extracted resources from the wellhead to the point of sale (specifically, the
“tailgate” of the processing plant) were not deducted from the royalties paid
to the plaintiffs. 35 WPX then incurred additional costs in transporting the
processed gas from the tailgate to “downstream” markets where it was able
to secure a higher price of sale. 36 There were two components to WPX’s
downstream transportation costs: (1) the “‘demand charge,’ which was a
charge paid by WPX to reserve space in the mainline pipelines . . . paid by
WPX whether or not it uses the pipeline to ship gas” and (2) the
“‘commodity charge,’ which was paid by WPX per unit volume actually
shipped on the pipeline.” 37 WPX deducted the commodity charge from
royalty payments in all instances; additionally, it deducted the demand
charge only in months where gas was shipped. 38
Plaintiffs alleged that the deduction of any costs incurred beyond the first
commercial market, i.e. both the demand charge and the commodity charge,
was improper. 39 Specifically, they argued that downstream transportation
costs may only be deducted if it can be shown that “(1) the costs are
reasonable and (2) the actual royalty revenues increase in proportion with
the costs assessed against the royalties.” 40 Here, the only element in dispute
is the second prong of the Plaintiff’s purported test. 41 Essentially, the
plaintiffs asserted that a test known as the “enhancement test” applied to
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. ¶ 1.
Id.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id. ¶ 8.
Id. ¶ 5.
Id. ¶ 6.
Id. ¶ 7.
Id. ¶ 9.
Id. ¶ 4.
Id.
Id.
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this scenario, which test was first set out by the court in Garman v. Conoco,
Inc. 42 as follows:
Upon obtaining a marketable product, any additional costs
incurred to enhance the value of the marketable gas, such as
those costs conceded by the [royalty owners], may be charged
against nonworking interest owners. To the extent that certain
processing costs enhance the value of an already marketable
product the burden should be placed upon the lessee to show
such costs are reasonable, and that actual royalty revenues
increase in proportion to the costs assessed against the
nonworking interest. 43
Additionally, the Plaintiffs contended that enhancement must be shown
on a month-to-month basis through comparison of the price in the Piceance
Basin to the price obtained in the downstream market. 44 Conversely, WPX
argued first, that the enhancement test did not apply to downstream market
transportation costs, and second, if it did apply, then the determination of
enhancement should be based upon the “prudent operator rule” and not a
month-to-month comparison. 45 Ultimately, the court agreed with WPX’s
first argument. 46
The court considered the cases relied upon by the District Court, being
Garman 47 and Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co., 48 and found the same “do
not require post-marketability transportation costs to meet the enhancement
test,” and therefore, such costs “are deductible, if they are reasonable.” 49
Furthermore, “lessees are not required to establish that such costs enhance
the value of the gas or increase the royalty revenues.” 50
The rule in the Garman case was that all costs incurred by the lessee in
making gas marketable must be borne entirely by the lessee and may not be
deducted from royalty payments. 51 The court in Lindauer noted that the
42. 886 P.2d 652 (Colo. 1994).
43. Lindauer, 2016 COA 39, ¶ 24 (quoting Garman, 886 P.2d at 661).
44. Id. ¶ 10.
45. Id. ¶ 11.
46. See id. ¶¶ 12-15 (finding that the enhancement test did apply to downstream market
transportation costs and that such enhancement should be determined on a month to month
comparison).
47. Garman v. Conoco, Inc., 886 P.2d 652 (Colo. 1994).
48. 29 P.3d 887 (Colo. 2001).
49. Lindauer, 2016 COA 39, ¶ 18.
50. Id.
51. Id. ¶ 21 (citing Garman, 886 P.2d at 659, 661).
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Garman decision focused on the “implied covenant to market” that is
contained in every oil and gas lease, specifically holding that “‘the implied
covenant to market obligates the lessee to incur those post-production costs
necessary to plate gas in a condition acceptable for market’ and that
‘[o]verriding royalty interest owners are not obligated to share in these
costs.’” 52 Additionally, the court highlighted that the “enhancement test” as
set forth in Garman was limited to “‘processing costs [that] enhance the
value of an already marketable product.’” 53 “Transportation costs” are not
the same as, or included within the meaning of, “processing costs”; in fact,
the royalty owners in the Garman case agreed that transportation costs were
deductible without any enhancement requirement. 54 Additionally, the next
sentence in the Garman opinion specifically addressed “‘expenses incurred
to process, transport, or compress already marketable gas’,” showing clear
indication that the court treated such “transportation costs” separately from
“processing costs.” 55 Based upon the foregoing, the Lindauer court
concluded that Garman did not apply the enhancement test to postmarketability transportation costs. 56
The ruling of Garman was reaffirmed in Rogers, where the court found
that in the context of a lease that is silent on the issue of permissible
deductions, the lessee must bear all costs of marketability under the implied
covenant to market. 57 Specifically, the Rogers court phrased its summary of
the Garman decision as follows: “‘We also determined [in Garman] … that
in those circumstances where the gas was marketable, and subsequent
production costs were incurred to enhance the value of the already
marketable gas, such subsequent costs may be shared by the lessors and
lessees provided that certain conditions are met’,” the referenced conditions
being both prongs of the enhancement test (i.e. reasonableness and
increased revenues). 58 Performing a similar analysis, the Lindauer court
noted that the Rogers decision did not apply generally to all postmarketability costs, but rather only to “production costs,” 59 and further
noted that there was no indication that such “production costs” were
intended to have a contrary meaning to those costs identified in Garman,
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. (citing Garman, 886 P.2d at 659).
Id. ¶ 27 (citing Garman, 886 P.2d at 661).
Id. ¶ 28.
Id. ¶ 29.
Id. ¶ 30.
Id. ¶ 31.
Id. (citing Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co., 29 P.3d 887 (Colo. 2001)).
Id. ¶ 32.
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“namely, ‘certain processing costs’ that enhance the value of the marketable
gas.” 60 It likewise found that the Rogers court later specifically addressed
transportation costs. 61 Significantly, the language applicable to
transportation costs in the Rogers case provided that the same would be
deductible from royalty payments so long as the costs were reasonable;
proof of increase of royalty revenues was not referenced. 62 According to the
above, the Lindauer court concluded that Rogers does not mandate the
application of the enhancement test to post-marketability transportation
costs, but instead requires only that such transportation costs be
reasonable. 63
Apart from distinguishing the Garman and Rogers cases as explained
above, the court also identified several other factors that weigh against
requiring transportation costs to meet the enhancement test. First, imposing
an enhancement requirement on downstream transportation costs “ignores
the ‘commercial realities of the marketplace’.” 64 Second, the enhancement
test “fails to take into account the long-term nature of decisions to market
gas downstream,” such as entering into long-term transportation contracts. 65
Third, requiring operators to prove that a downstream market would
enhance the value of the gas prior to deducting such costs “could
discourage them from pursuing a downstream marketing strategy” that
would ultimately benefit both lessor and lessee. 66 Because the plaintiffs in
this case conceded that WPX’s downstream transportation costs were
reasonable, the court found that such costs were deductible from royalty
payments; 67 “transportation costs beyond the first commercial market need
not enhance the value of the gas . . . to be deductible from royalty
payments.” 68
60. Id. ¶¶ 32-33.
61. Id. ¶ 34.
62. Id. ¶ 34 (quoting Rogers, 29 P.3d at 906) (“Once a product is marketable, however,
additional costs incurred to either improve the product, or transport the product, are to be
shared proportionately by the lessor and lessee. All costs must be reasonable.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
63. Id. ¶ 40.
64. Id. ¶ 40 (quoting Rogers, 29. P.3d at 905).
65. Id. ¶ 46 (noting that “a month by month enhancement requirement is inconsistent
with the long-term nature of the downstream marketing strategy and its long-term benefits”).
66. Id. ¶ 48 (finding such a rule would allow lessors to have a “‘free ride’,” enjoying the
long-term benefits of downstream markets without paying their proportionate share of the
costs).
67. Id. ¶ 54.
68. Id. ¶ 53.
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B. Local Bans on Hydraulic Fracturing
In both City of Longmont69 and City of Fort Collins, 70 the Colorado Oil
and Gas Association (“COGA”) brought suit against the respective homerule cities and sought injunctions against enforcement of each city’s
regulations relating to bans on fracking. 71 While the arguments put forth
were slightly different, the court applied the same rationale and reached the
same conclusion in each case. The portions of the court’s analysis which
are common to both cases are discussed herein, with the specifics of each
city’s ordinance and case-specific items being discussed in more details
under the two subsections below.
The majority of the court’s analysis in determining whether local
governments were permitted to regulate fracking revolved around
Colorado’s law of preemption. First, the court noted that the state
Constitution recognizes the sovereignty of home-rule cities, quoting the
following language:
The people of each city or town of this state … are hereby vested
with, and they shall always have, power to make, amend, add to
or replace the charter of said city or town, which shall be its
organic law and extend to all its local and municipal matters.
Such charter and ordinances made pursuant thereto in such
matters shall supersede within the territorial limits and other
jurisdiction of said city or town any law of the state in conflict
therewith. 72
Thus, a home-rule ordinance will supersede a conflicting state statute in
a matter purely of local concern. 73 If, however, the subject matter is of
purely state, or mixed state and local, concern, the state law will supersede
a conflicting home-rule ordinance. 74 If no conflict exists between the state
and local law, then both may coexist. 75
69. 2016 CO 29, 369 P.3d 573.
70. 2016 CO 28, 369 P.3d 586.
71. Id.; City of Longmont, 2016 CO 29.
72. City of Longmont, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 16, 369 P.3d at 579; City of Fort Collins, 2016 CO
29, ¶ 12, 369 P.3d at 591.
73. City of Longmont, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 17, 369 P.3d at 579; City of Fort Collins, 2016 CO
29, ¶ 13, 369 P.3d at 591.
74. City of Longmont, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 18 369 P.3d at 579; City of Fort Collins, 2016 CO
29, ¶ 14, 369 P.3d at 591.
75. City of Longmont, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 18; City of Fort Collins, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 14, 369
P.3d at 591.
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The first inquiry in a preemption analysis is whether the subject matter of
the relevant home-rule ordinance “involves a matter of statewide, local, or
mixed state and local concern.” 76 The “‘relative interests of the state and the
municipality in regulating the particular issue’” must be considered “on a
case-by-case basis considering the totality of the circumstances” when
making this determination. 77 Additionally, the following factors, inter alia,
should guide the court’s inquiry: “(1) the need for statewide uniformity of
regulation, (2) the extraterritorial impact of the local regulation, (3) whether
the state or local governments have traditionally regulated the matter, and
(4) whether the Colorado Constitution specifically commits the matter to
either state or local regulation.” 78 In applying the above analysis, the court
concluded that the home-rule cities’ regulations seeking to regulate fracking
involved a matter of mixed state and local concern because it implicates the
need for uniform statewide regulation and the extraterritorial impact of a
fracking ban, on the one hand, and the local government’s traditional
authority to exercise its zoning authority over land where oil and gas
development occurs, on the other.” 79
When a local ordinance touches a matter of statewide concern, the next
inquiry is whether such ordinance conflicts with state law; if such conflict
exists, the state law will preempt the local ordinance. 80 Preemption may
occur in one of three ways: express, implied, or operational conflict. 81
Express and implied preemption are “‘primarily matters of statutory
interpretation’.” 82 Express preemption occurs when the legislature “clearly
and unequivocally states its intent to prohibit a local government from
exercising its authority over the subject matter at issue.” 83 Implied
preemption occurs when there is evidence of “legislative intent to
76. City of Longmont, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 19, 369 P.3d at 579 (internal citations omitted);
City of Fort Collins, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 15, 369 P.3d at 591. (internal citations omitted).
77. City of Longmont, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 20, 369 P.3d at 580 (internal citations omitted).
78. City of Longmont, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 20; City of Fort Collins, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 15, 369
P.3d at 591.
79. City of Longmont, 2016 CO 29, ¶¶ 21-31, 369 P.3d at 580-81; City of Fort Collins,
2016 CO 29, ¶ 16, 369 P.3d at 591.
80. City of Longmont, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 32, 369 P.3d at 581; City of Fort Collins, 2016 CO
29, ¶ 17, 369 P.3d at 591.
81. City of Longmont, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 33, 369 P.3d at 582; City of Fort Collins, 2016 CO
29, ¶ 18, 369 P.3d at 591.
82. City of Longmont, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 33; City of Fort Collins, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 18, 369
P.3d at 591.
83. City of Longmont, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 34, 369 P.3d at 582 (internal citations omitted);
City of Fort Collins, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 19, 369 P.3d at 592 (internal citations omitted).
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completely occupy a given field by reason of a dominant state interest.” 84 In
ascertaining whether such intent exists, the language of the statute, together
with the scope of purpose of the statutory scheme, must be considered. 85
Finally, the court acknowledged that in prior cases they had articulated
different standards to determine whether a conflict by operational law
exists, 86 but clarified in these cases that preemption by operational conflict
exists when “the effectuation of a local interest would materially impede or
destroy a state interest.” 87 The court further explained that such an analysis
requires assessment of “the interplay between the state and local regulatory
schemes,” which generally will involve “a facial evaluation of the
respective statutory and regulatory schemes, not a factual inquiry as to the
effect of those schemes ‘on the ground.’” 88
None of the parties in either case alleged that state law expressly
preempted local governments from regulating oil and gas development or
fracking. 89 In both cases, the court disagreed with COGA’s assertion that
Colorado’s Oil and Gas Conservation Act (“Act”) impliedly preempted the
home-rule regulations at issue, stating that “[t]o the contrary, the General
Assembly has recognized the propriety of local land-use ordinances that
relate to oil and gas development.” 90 Thus, the question of whether
preemption existed here turned on whether there was operational conflict
between the home-rule regulation and the Act. 91
The state’s interest in oil and gas development, and the legislature’s
intent in enacting the Act, is explicitly stated as follows:

84. City of Longmont, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 35, 369 P.3d at 582 (internal citations omitted);
City of Fort Collins, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 20, 369 P.3d at 592 (internal citations omitted).
85. City of Longmont, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 35, 369 P.3d at 582; City of Fort Collins, 2016 CO
29, ¶ 20, 369 P.3d at 592. (finding mere enactment of a statute addressing certain activities is
insufficient to infer the intent required for implied preemption); City of Fort Collins, 2016
CO 29, ¶ 20, 369 P.3d at 592.
86. City of Longmont, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 16, 369 P.3d at 582.
87. City of Longmont, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 42, 369 P.3d at 583; City of Fort Collins, 2016 CO
29, ¶ 21, 369 P.3d at 592.
88. City of Longmont, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 42, 369 P.3d at 583; City of Fort Collins, 2016 CO
29, ¶ 21, 369 P.3d at 592.
89. City of Longmont, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 44, 369 P.3d at 583; City of Fort Collins, 2016 CO
29, ¶ 23, 369 P.3d at 592.
90. City of Longmont, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 46, 369 P.3d at 583; City of Fort Collins, 2016 CO
29, ¶ 25, 369 P.3d at 592. See City of Longmont, 2016 CO 29, ¶¶ 45-47, 369 P.3d at 583-84,
for a more detailed discussion of whether implied preemption exists.
91. City of Longmont, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 48, 369 P.3d at 584; City of Fort Collins, 2016 CO
29, ¶ 26, 369 P.3d at 592.
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It is the intent and purpose of this article to permit each oil and
gas pool in Colorado to produce up to its maximum efficient rate
of production, subject to the prevention of waste, consistent with
the protection of public health, safety, and welfare, including
protection of the coequal and correlative rights of the owners and
producers of a common source of oil and gas, so that each
common owner and producer may obtain a just and equitable
share of production therefrom. 92
Under the Act’s authority, the Colorado Oil and Gas Commission
(“COGCC”) promulgates rules, regulations and orders covering a number
of topics, including “the ‘drilling, producing, and plugging of wells and all
other operations for the production of oil or gas,’ the ‘shooting and
chemical treatment of wells,’ and the spacing of wells” 93 for the purpose of
preventing waste and conserving oil and gas resources while protecting the
public health, safety and welfare. 94 Ultimately, the court held in each case
that the Act and the COGCC’s rules and regulations evidenced a strong
state interest and control over numerous aspects of fracking and that each
respective local regulation “materially impedes the effectuation of the
state’s interest.” 95
1. Longmont
In 2012, the residents of Longmont voted to add Article XVI to
Longmont’s home-rule charter, providing as follows:
It shall hereby be the policy of the City of Longmont that it is
prohibited to use hydraulic fracturing to extract oil, gas, or other
hydrocarbons within the City of Longmont. In addition, within
the City of Longmont, it is prohibited to store in open pits or
dispose of solid or liquid wastes created in connection with the

92. City of Longmont, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 50, 369 P.3d at 584 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. §
34-60-102(1)(b) (2015)); City of Fort Collins, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 27, 369 P.3d at 593 (quoting
COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-102(1)(b) (2015)).
93. City of Longmont, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 51, 369 P.3d at 584 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. §§
34-60-105(1);34-60-106(2)(a)-(c) (2015)); City of Fort Collins, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 28, 369 P.3d
at 592 (citing C.R.S. §§ 34-60-105(1) and 34-60-106(2)(a)-(c) (2015)).
94. City of Longmont, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 52, 369 P.3d at 584 (internal citations omitted);
City of Fort Collins, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 29, 369 P.3d at 592 (internal citations omitted).
95. City of Longmont, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 53, 369 P.3d at 585; City of Fort Collins, 2016 CO
29, ¶¶ 29-30, 369 P.3d at 592.
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hydraulic fracturing process, including but not limited to
flowback or produced wastewater and brine. 96
COGA sued Longmont, seeking a permanent injunction enjoining, and a
declaratory judgment invalidating, Article XVI. 97 The District Court
granted both motions but stayed its order, pending appeal; Longmont
residents and citizen intervenors appealed and the case was thereafter
transferred to the Colorado Supreme Court. 98 Specifically, Longmont
argued on appeal that the District Court’s preemption analysis was in error,
and that “the inalienable rights provision of the Colorado Constitution
trumps any preemption analysis and requires [the court] to conclude that
Article XVI supersedes state law.” 99
As discussed hereinabove, the court agreed with the District Court’s
analysis that the state law in fact preempted the local charter due to
operational conflict. In addition, the court was not persuaded by the
citizens’ inalienable rights proposition. 100 The “inalienable rights” provision
of the Colorado Constitution is found in Article II, Section 3, and reads as
follows: “All persons have certain natural, essential and inalienable rights,
among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their
lives and liberties; of acquiring, possessing and protecting property; and of
seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness.” 101 Under the proffered
reading of this provision, “no local regulation alleged to concern life,
liberty, property, safety, or happiness could ever be preempted, and thus,
such local regulations would always supersede state law. Such a result
would arguably render the home-rule provision of our constitution, art. XX,
§ 6, unnecessary, and we cannot countenance such a result.” 102 The court
made reference to certain Pennsylvania precedent and an amendment to
their constitution which established a public trust doctrine, but explained
that no such constitutional provision or doctrine existed in Colorado. 103
Additionally, the court also noted that the citizens conceded that there is no
authority in Colorado to support the application of the inalienable rights
provision of the constitution to the preemption analysis. 104
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

City of Longmont, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 4, 369 P.3d at 577.
Id. ¶ 5, 369 P.3d at 577.
Id. ¶¶ 6-7, 369 P.3d at 577.
Id. ¶ 7, 369 P.3d at 577.
Id. ¶ 57, 369 P.3d at 585.
Id. ¶ 58, 369 P.3d at 577 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. ¶ 59, 369 P.3d at 586.
Id. ¶¶ 60-62, 369 P.3d at 586.
Id. ¶ 58, 369P.3d at 586.
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2. Fort Collins
In 2013, the residents of Fort Collins voted in favor of the following
citizen-initiated ordinance:
An ordinance placing a moratorium on hydraulic fracturing and
the storage of its waste products within the City of Fort Collins
or on lands under its jurisdiction for a period of five years,
without exemption, in order to fully study the impacts of this
process on property values and human health, which moratorium
can be lifted upon a ballot measure approved by the people of
the City of Fort Collins and which shall apply retroactively as of
the date this measure was found to have qualified for placement
on the ballot. 105
The municipal code of Fort Collins was also amended to provide that
“‘[t]he use of hydraulic fracturing to extract oil, gas or other hydrocarbons,
and the storage in open pits of solid or liquid wastes and/or flowback
created in connection with the hydraulic fracturing process, are prohibited
within the City.’” 106 COGA sued Fort Collins, seeking a permanent
injunction enjoining, and a declaratory judgment invalidating, the aforesaid
ordinance. 107 The District Court granted COGA’s motions; Fort Collins
residents and a number of other interested parties appealed and the case was
thereafter transferred to the Colorado Supreme Court. 108 Specifically, Fort
Collins argued on appeal that the District Court’s preemption analysis was
in error 109 and that “a five-year moratorium is sufficiently different from a
perpetual ban [and] that the former may be a valid exercise of zoning
authority even if the latter constitutes a material impediment to the
effectuation of the state’s interest.” 110
The District Court found that the state law impliedly preempted the local
ordinance; 111 the Supreme Court disagreed that the preemption was implied,
but did find that that local ordinance was preempted by operational conflict
as discussed in more detail above. In support of its second argument, Fort
Collins asserted that fracking was a nonessential portion of production and
that the moratorium was akin to a “temporary ‘time-out’,” which was
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

City of Fort Collins v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 2016 CO 28, ¶ 3, 369 P.3d 586, 589.
Id. ¶ 4, 369 P.3d at 589 (internal citations omitted).
Id. ¶ 5, 369 P.3d at 589.
Id. ¶¶ 6-7, 369 P.3d at 589.
Id. ¶ 7, 369 P.3d at 590.
Id. ¶ 31, 369 P.3d at 593.
Id. ¶ 6, 369 P.3d at 589-90.
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permitted in Williams v. City of Central.112 The court addressed these
assertions separately. First, it held that “even though it may be possible to
produce oil and gas without fracking while the moratorium is in effect, the
moratorium interferes with the many operators who have determined that
fracking is necessary to ensure productive recovery.” 113 The result of the
foregoing was that the state’s goal of permitting maximum and efficient
production of each oil and gas pool in Colorado was materially impeded. 114
Second, the court was not persuaded that the length of the moratorium
should have the local ordinance from preemption. In comparison to
Williams, 115 which discussed a 10-month moratorium, the moratorium at
issue here was for five years; “we view such a lengthy moratorium as
different in kind from a brief moratorium that is truly a ‘temporary timeout.’” 116 The court found Claridge House One, Inc. v. Borough of Verona 117
to be more analogous, wherein a one-year moratorium on rental condos
being converted into condominiums was preempted by state law because
(1) the regulation did not regulate, but forbid, the practice, and (2) even
though only for one year, the moratorium had a deleterious effect on a
statewide program of regulation. 118
Highlighting that the moratorium at issue in Fort Collins is not merely a
regulation, but a prohibition, the court held that the local ordinance likewise
deleteriously affected a statewide program of regulation and impeded the
goals of the state’s Act and its interest in fracking. 119 It is important to note,
however, that the court also specifically stated that “[w]e express no view
as to the propriety of a moratorium of materially shorter duration.” 120
Consequently, if a local government attempts to enforce a moratorium that
is shorter than the moratorium at issue in Fort Collins, it is unclear what
result the court would reach if the same were to be challenged. 121

112. Id. ¶ 32, 369 P.3d at 593 (citing Williams v. City of Central, 907 P.2d 701 (Colo.
App. 1995)).
113. Id. ¶ 33, 369 P.3d at 593.
114. Id.
115. Williams v. City of Central, 907 P.2d 701 (Colo. App. 1995).
116. City of Fort Collins, 2016 CO 28, ¶ 35, 369 P.3d at 594.
117. 490 F. Supp. 706 (C.N.J. 1980, aff’d 633 F.2d 209 (3d Cir. 1980).
118. City of Fort Collins, 2016 CO 28, ¶ 36, 369 P.3d at 594.
119. Id. ¶ 37, 369 P.3d at 594.
120. Id. ¶ 40, 369 P.3d at 594.
121. Based upon the court’s persuasion by the one-year prohibition contained in Claridge
House One, 490 F. Supp. 706, it appears likely that a moratorium affecting the oil and gas
industry would need to be shorter than one year in length in order to possibly be upheld.
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C. Additional Case Summaries
Three additional cases which also affect the oil and gas industry are
discussed briefly herein. First, in Rocky Mountain Exploration, Inc. v.
Davis Graham & Stubbs LLP, 122 the seller of certain oil and gas interests
sued the law firm representing the buyer’s principal, alleging that they had
engaged in misconduct such as conspiracy to use a strawman purchaser,
aiding and abetting of breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference with
business expectancy, and aiding and abetting fraud by failing to disclose
that the buyer was acting as an agent for another undisclosed entity. 123 The
court upheld the lower court’s findings, inter alia, that the use of a
strawman in the mineral acquisition was not fraudulent and that the seller
did not state a claim that the law firm had a duty to disclose that it
represented the undisclosed principal. 124 Sellers also asserted that the
creation of an area of mutual interest (“AMI”) in the purchase and sale
agreement amounted to the creation of a joint venture between the parties;
however, the court found that, based upon the plain language of the
agreement, no joint venture existed (e.g. “. . . ‘It is not the intention of the
parties to create, nor shall this agreement be construed as creating, a . . .
joint venture . . . or to render the parties liable as partners, co-ventures, or
principals . . . .’”). 125
Second, in Owens v. Tergeson, 126 the court reaffirmed the validity of
mineral reservations contained in habendum clauses of deeds. In dispute in
this case was whether a mineral reservation referenced only in a habendum
clause was effective since it was not included in the granting clause of the
deed. 127 Referencing rules of construction 128 and precedent within the state,
the court concluded that a reservation of interest set forth in the habendum
clause was in fact valid (e.g. “[I]n most jurisdictions a clear and special
designation of the particular estate conveyed, whether contained in the
122. 2016 COA 33 (“[A] petition for rehearing in the court of appeals or a petition for
certiorari in the supreme court may be pending.”).
123. Id.
124. Id. ¶¶ 1, 4.
125. Id. ¶¶ 2, 42.
126. 2015 COA 164, 363 P.3d 826.
127. Id. ¶¶ 2-6, 363 P.3d at 828-829.
128. Some rules of construction referenced by the court include the terms as written in a
deed must be given effect; ambiguities in reservations of oil and gas must favor the grantee;
language in the deed must be construed in harmony with its plain and generally accepted
meaning; the overall intend of the deed should control, etc. See id. ¶¶ 15-19, 363 P.3d at
830-31.
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granting or in the habendum clause, will prevail over conflicting but merely
general or formal language of the opposite clause.”). 129 The court also held
that a specific person does not need to be identified in the reservation in
order for the same to be valid as the reservation may be presumed to be
unto the grantors. “[A]n unadorned reservation clause evidences an intent
by the grantors to reserve for themselves the mineral rights in the land.” 130
Lastly, the Supreme Court of Colorado granted a writ of Certiorari in a
case which may affect taxation of oil and gas. On February 29, 2016, the
court granted certiorari in Kinder Morgan CO2 Co., L.P. v. Montezuma
County Board of Commissioners, 131 one issue for consideration being
whether the lower court properly determined that House Bill 90-1018
amended C.R.S. § 39-10-107(1) to allow retroactive assessment of property
taxes on the value of oil and gas leaseholds which were omitted due to the
underreporting of the selling price of the oil or gas, or quantity sold,
therefrom. 132
III. Legislation
A. Overview of Bills That Did Not Pass
During the 2016 legislative session, six bills were introduced which
affected the oil and gas industry. Four of these bills were submitted by the
House of Representatives (“House”) and two of these bills were submitted
by the Senate. Notably, only one bill, being Senate Bill 16-218, was signed
by the Governor. The other five bills did not pass; however, a brief
summary of each is provided below for informational purposes.
First, House Bill 16-1310 concerned the liability for the conduct of oil
and gas operation. This proposed bill would have amended the current
governing relations between oil and gas operators and surface owners to
“allow proof that the operator’s oil and gas operations harmed the surface
owner’s use of the surface of the land, caused bodily injury to the surface
owner or any person residing on the property of the surface owner, or
damaged the surface owner’s property.” 133 It also would have held

129. Id. ¶ 20, 363 P.3d at 830 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court also
expressed the differences between the habendum clause and a warranty clause. See id. ¶¶ 2426, 363 P.3d at 832-33.
130. Id. ¶ 28, 363 P.3d at 833.
131. No. 15SC595, 2016 WL 768449 (Colo. 2016).
132. Id.
133. H.B. 16-1310, 70th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2016).
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operators strictly liable if their conduct, including fracking, caused an
earthquake that damaged property or injured a person. 134
Second, House Bill 16-1355 concerned the ability of local governments
to exercise land use authority over oil and gas facilities used in oil and gas
operations in a manner analogous to the siting of other industrial facilities.
Specifically, it would have repealed the limitation that “local governments
have so-called ‘House Bill 1041’ powers . . . only if the Colorado oil and
gas conservation commission has identified a specific area for
designation.” 135 Additionally, it would have granted local governments the
specific authority to regulate the siting of oil and gas facilities and specified
that the COGCC’s authority to regulate oil and gas does not preempt local
governments’ siting authority. 136
Third, House Bill 16-1430 concerned the implementation of the
recommendation for an oil and gas task force regarding the sharing of oil
and gas operators’ development plans with affected local governments. This
bill proposed codification of the “essential elements” of one of the task
force’s two recommendations by requiring operators to share their
development plans with municipalities affected by their proposed
operations. 137
Fourth, House Bill 16-1468 concerned costs that may be deducted by a
taxpayer as transportation, manufacturing, and processing costs for
purposes of calculating the net amount realized by the taxpayer for the sale
of oil and gas. This proposed bill limited the costs that a taxpayer may
deduct for the purpose of calculation excise tax on the severance of oil and
gas to “the direct costs actually paid by the taxpayer for transporting,
manufacturing, and processing,” rather than “any” costs borne by the
taxpayer; it further provided that “any compression downstream of the
meter or measurement point is deductible as a component of
transportation.” 138

134. Id.
135. H.B. 16-1355, 70th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo 2016).
136. Id.; but see II. CASE LAW, B. Local Bans on Hydraulic Fracturing above for a
summary of two cases which reach the opposite conclusion of the proposals contained in this
introduced bill, i.e. the state law preempted the local regulations.
137. H.B. 16-1430, 70th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo 2016) (“engrossed”); see IV.
REGULATION herein for a discussion of the recommendations of the task force and the rules
promulgated pursuant thereto.
138. H.B. 16-1468, 70th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2016); see BP America
Production Co. v. Colorado Department of Revenue, 2016 CO 23, 369 P.3d 281, 2016 CO
23 (Colo. 2016) (considering the unaltered language of that statute as discussed in II. CASE
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Fifth, Senate Bill 16-129 proposed that the word “foster” be replaced
with “administer” in the statute creating the oil and gas task force “so as to
require neutral administration by the [COGCC] with respect to oversight of
its oil and gas operations.” 139
B. Senate Bill 16-218
Senate Bill 16-218, concerning matters related to state severance tax
refunds, was signed by the Governor on June 10, 2016. Although this bill
does not directly address the oil and gas industry, as seen in the discussion
of BP America Production Co. 140 hereinabove, oil and gas operators are
impacted by severance taxes. Specifically, this bill added § 107.8 (Refunds)
to the severance tax statute. 141 This section requires the State Treasurer to
set aside a certain portion of revenue generated from collection of
severance tax for the payment of refunds; at the end of each month, any
revenues not required for a refund shall be the total gross receipts realized
available for allocation under § 108. 142 If, prior to July 1, 2016, the amount
in the reserve is less than the amount of refunds to be made from the
reserve, the State Treasurer shall credit the reserve with proceeds from the
collection of income tax in an amount equal to the amount of the deficit. 143
Additionally, on or after July 1, 2016, but prior to July 1, 2017, the State
Treasurer shall credit the reserve with income tax proceeds “in an amount
equal to the amount by which the refunds for the tax imposed pursuant to
this article that are made for a month exceed fifteen percent of the gross
severance tax revenues for the same month”; 144 this shall be done on a
monthly basis. 145 If there is insufficient revenue to be credited, the State
Controller may authorize an advance, unlimited in amount, to the reserve
for the purpose of refunds. 146
In addition to incorporating the above refund provisions, the bill also
amended the date of repeal in § 39-29-108(2)(a)(II) (allocation of severance

LAW, A. Permissible Deductions, 1. Cost of Capital as Deduction under Severance Tax
Statute, above).
139. S.B. 16-129, 70th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2016).
140. BP America Production Co. v. Colorado Department of Revenue, 2016 CO 23, 369
P.3d 281.
141. H.B. 16-218, 70th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2016).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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tax revenues) from January 1, 2017 to July 1, 2017. 147 Furthermore, the bill
restricted funds in the severance tax perpetual base fund, codified in C.R.S.
§ 39-29-109(2)(a)(XVII) as follows:
Notwithstanding any provision of this paragraph (a) to the
contrary, an amount equal to Nineteen Million One Hundred
Thousand Dollars in the fund is restricted from being used for
any purpose whatsoever, until such time as the Joint Budget
Committee, by a majority vote, releases the restriction on some
or all of the money. 148
A similar restriction was placed on the severance tax operational fund, in
the amount of Ten Million Dollars, 149 and the local government severance
tax fund, in the amount of Forty-Eight Million Three Hundred Thousand
Dollars. 150 The bill also amended C.R.S. § 39-22-623(1)(b), pertaining to
disposition of collections of income tax, 151 and added C.R.S. § 24-75201.1(1)(d)(XVII), pertaining to the state’s use of general funds. 152
IV. Regulation153
A. Overview of Recommendations from Oil and Gas Task Force
On September 8, 2014, Governor John Hickenlooper issued Executive
Order B 2014-005, creating the Task Force on State and Local Regulation
of Oil and Gas Operations (hereinafter referred to as the “Task Force”). 154
The objectives of the Task Force were numerous, focusing on how to
reasonably and effectively balance land use issues while minimizing
conflicts, protecting communities, and allowing access to private mineral
rights. 155 The Task Force was comprised of twenty-one members, six of
whom represented the oil and gas, agricultural and home building
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. (“It is the General Assembly’s intent that the restriction of money in the fund
shall not affect the distributions made under paragraph (c) of subsection (1) of this section.”)
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Any capitalized terms used but not defined herein shall have the meanings ascribed
to them in the COGCC Rules.
154. State of Colorado, Office of the Governor, Executive Order B 2014 005, as
amended by Executive Order B 2014 006.
155. See Oil and Gas Task Force, COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES,
http://dnr.state.co.us/OGTASKFORCE/Pages/home.aspx (last visited Sept. 20, 2016).
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industries, six of whom represented local government and the conservation
community, and seven of whom represented “a variety of interests.” 156 The
Task Force convened monthly from September, 2014 to February, 2015; a
report of its recommendations and findings was due to the Governor no
later than February 27, 2015, with recommendations regarding new or
amended legislation requiring a two-thirds vote of approval. 157 Ultimately,
the Task Force submitted nine recommendations to the Governor, two of
which (being Recommendations #17 and #20) required implementation via
formal rulemaking procedures by the COGCC. 158 Both of the aforesaid
recommendations were implemented during the timeframe for this update,
with new rules being adopted on January 25, 2016, published by the
Secretary of State on February 25, 2016, and effective on March 16,
2016. 159
The Final Report of the Task Force was submitted to the Governor on
February 27, 2015. 160 Such Final Report titles Recommendation #17 as
follows: Recommendation to Facilitate Collaboration of Local
Governments, Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission and
Operators Relative to Oil and Gas Locations and Urban Planning. 161 In
summary, “Recommendation #17 calls for the COGCC to define and adopt
a process for improved local government involvement during the COGCC
permitting process for Applications to Drill (APD) concerning the location
of large scale oil and gas facilities in Urban Mitigation Areas (UMA).” 162
Recommendation #20 was titled “Recommendation to Include Future Oil
and Gas Drilling and Production Facilities in Existing Local
Comprehensive Planning Processes.” 163 In summary, “Recommendation
#20 proposes that all operators would be required to register in the
municipalities in which they have operations and provide information on
their planned development and operations within those municipalities.” 164
156. Executive Order B 2014 005 at III(A); Executive Order B 2014 006 at I.
157. Executive Order B 2014 005 at II(E) and IV.
158. COGCC Oil and Gas Task Force Rulemaking Summary, COGA,
http://www.coga.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/COGCC-Oil-Gas-TF-RulemakingSummary-Whitepaper.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2016).
159. Id.
160. Colorado Oil and Gas Task Force Final Report, COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF
NATURAL RESOURCES, http://dnr.state.co.us/ogtaskforce/Documents/OilGasTaskForceFinal
Report.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2016).
161. Id. at 5.
162. COGCC Oil and Gas Task Force Rulemaking Summary, supra.
163. Colorado Oil and Gas Task Force Final Report, supra, at 9.
164. COGCC Oil and Gas Task Force Rulemaking Summary, supra.
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Both Recommendations #17 and #20 were unanimously approved by the
Task Force members. 165
B. Implementation of Rules Pursuant to Recommendation #17
The COGCC Rules implementing Recommendation #17 include
additions and amendments to the 100, 300 and 600 Series of rules.
Specifically, a definition of “Large UMA Facility” was added to the 100
Series, meaning “any Oil and Gas Location proposed to be located in an
Urban Mitigation Area and on which: (1) the operator proposes to drill 8 or
more new wells; or (2) the cumulative new and existing on-site storage
capacity for produced hydrocarbons exceeds 4,000 barrels.” 166 Procedures
for the notification of and consultation with local governments regarding
Large UMA Facilities were added as Rule 305A. These procedures require
operators proposing a Large UMA Facility to provide written notice of
intent to construct the same (“Notice”) to the local government with land
use authority over the proposed location and the Surface Owner of said
lands not less than 90 days prior to initiating the Form 2A COGCC
permitting process. 167 Such Notice must include the following information:
(1) A description and depiction of the proposed Oil and Gas
Location and the planned facilities;
(2) A description of the siting rationale for proposing to locate
the facility within the Urban Mitigation Area, including a
description of other sites considered and the reasons such
alternate sites were rejected; and
(3) An offer to consult with the local government with land use
authority over the proposed location to seek agreement regarding
siting the Large UMA Facility, considering alternative locations
and potential best management practices. 168
In regard to consultation, the local government with land use authority
over the proposed Large UMA Facility location has thirty days from receipt

165. Colorado Oil and Gas Task Force Final Report, supra, at 5, 9.
166. COGCC’s Adopted Rules Implementing Governor’s Oil and Gas Task Force
Recommendation Nos. 17 and 20, COLORADO OIL & GAS CONSERVATION COMMISSION (Feb.
1, 2016), http://cogcc.state.co.us/documents/reg/Rules/GtfRulemaking/Final%20Rule%20
Docs/20160201%20Adopted%20Rules.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2016).
167. 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:305A(a) (2016).
168. Id. § 404-1:305A(b).
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of the Notice to accept the operator’s offer to consult. 169 If such offer is
accepted, the operator shall consult with the local government in good faith
about the “siting of, and best management practices to be employed at, the
proposed location.” 170 Surface Owners who receive the Notice may also
elect to participate in the consultation process so that their siting requests
and concerns may be considered. 171 Similarly, within thirty days of
receiving the Notice, if the Surface Owner requests a meeting with the
operator and Director regarding the siting of the proposed Large UMA
Facility, the Director will schedule such meeting. 172 The Director will also
participate in the consultation process if either the operator or the local
government so request. 173 Notably, the rules do not prescribe any particular
format for the consultation. 174
If an agreement as to the location of the Large UMA Facility is not
reached through the consultation process, “the operator shall offer in
writing to engage in mediation with the local government.” 175 The local
government is not required to accept such offer, but if it does so, the parties
shall jointly select a mediator(s) and equally share the cost. 176 The
mediation should conclude within forty-five days of the election of
mediators, unless the parties agree upon an extension of time. 177 The
Director, while not a party to the mediation, may provide technical
assistance to the parties or the mediator if requested. 178
If an agreement is reached through the consultation process, or upon the
occurrence of any of the following, the operator may submit its Form 2A to
the COGCC: (1) the operator asserts the proposed Large UMA Facility is
subject to an exception pursuant to Rule 305A.e.; (2) the local government
waives the Rule 305A procedures in writing; (3) the local government fails
to respond in writing within thirty days of receipt of Notice; or (4) at least
ninety days have passed since the local government and operator engaged
in the consultation process but have not reached an agreement. 179 Any Form
169. Id. § 404-1:305A(c).
170. Id.
171. Id. § 404-1:305(c)(1).
172. Id. § 404-1:305(d).
173. Id. § 404-1:305(c)(2).
174. Id. § 404-1:305(c)(4).
175. Id. § 404-1:305(c)(3).
176. Id. § 404-1:305(c)(3)(A).
177. Id. § 404-1:305(c)(3)(B).
178. Id. § 404-1:305(c)(3)(C).
179. Id. § 404-1:305(f)(1). With respect to (5) as stated above, “the operator may initiate
the Form 2A process with its preferred site, but must state on the Form 2A that the local
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2A that does not include documentation demonstrating compliance with
Rule 305A will be rejected. 180
Exceptions to the Large UMA Facility notification and consultation
process are outlined in Rule 305A.e. Specifically, said Rule provides that an
operator is exempt from the Notice and consultation procedures described
in Rule 305A.a.-d. in any of four circumstances. First, the local government
may “opt out” of the notification and consultation process through written
notification to the Director stating that it does not wish to receive Notices
for proposed Large UMA Facilities in its jurisdiction. 181 Second, the
operator and local government may be parties to an existing agreement
which covers the siting of proposed Large UMA Facilities; in this instance,
the operator must submit a copy of the relevant agreement provisions with
its Form 2A. 182 Third, the proposed Large UMA Facility site is “within an
approved site specific development plan (as defined in §24-68-102(4)(a),
C.R.S., that establishes vested property rights as defined in §24-68-103,
C.R.S.), and which expressly governs the location of Wells or Production
Facilities on the surface estate.” 183 If so, the operator must likewise submit
a copy of the relevant portions of the plan and local government approval
with its Form 2A. 184 Fourth, the proposed location of the Large UMA
Facility is “within acreage identified as an oil and gas operations area
included in an approved ‘Application for Development’” as defined in
C.R.S. § 24-65.5-101, et. seq. 185 In regard to the third and fourth
circumstances outlined above, the operator must likewise submit a copy of
the relevant portions of the plan and local government approval with its
Form 2A. 186 Additionally, as to the second, third, and fourth circumstances,
the Director may confer with the local government to determine whether
the proposed Large UMA Facility is within the scope of the cited agreement
or plan. 187 If, after thirty days, the Director determines that the proposed
Large UMA Facility is not within the scope of the same, the Form 2A will
be rejected and the operator will be notified to otherwise comply with Rule
government does not agree with the site for the proposed Large UMA facility.” Id. § 4041:305(f)(1)(E). These types of Form 2As will be docketed for a COGCC hearing according
to the rules set forth in Rule 305A.f.1.E.i-iii.
180. Id. § 404-1:305(f)(2).
181. Id. § 404-1:305(e)(1)(a).
182. Id. § 404-1:305(e)(1)(b).
183. Id. § 404-1:305A(e)(1)(c).
184. Id.
185. Id. § 404-1:305(e)(1)(d).
186. Id. § 404-1:305(c), (d).
187. Id. § 404-1:305(e)(2).
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305A.a.-d. 188 Finally, all Rule 604.c.(4) requirements apply to Large UMA
Facilities, whether or not a particular Large UMA Facility is excepted from
Rule 305A.a.-d. under Rule 305A.e. 189
Rule 604.c.(4) was added to the 600 Rules in the implementation of
Recommendation #17. The objective of such Rule was that “Large UMA
Facilities should be built as far as possible from existing building units and
operated using the best available technology to avoid or minimize adverse
impacts to adjoining land uses.” 190 In order to achieve this objective, all
Rule 604.c.(3) Exception Zone Setback mitigation measures are required
for Large UMA Facilities, irrespective of whether the same are located in a
Buffer Zone or an Exception Zone. 191 Further, a Form 2A for a Large UMA
Facility will not be approved until the Oil and Gas Location Assessment
permit for the same incorporates best management practices addressing the
following:
i. Fire, explosion, chemical, and toxic emission hazards,
including lightning strike hazards.
ii. Fluid leak detection, repair, reporting, and record keeping for
all above and below ground on-site fluid handling, storage, and
transportation equipment.
iii. Automated well shut-in control measures to prevent gas
venting during emission control system failures or other upset
conditions.
iv. Zero flaring or venting of gas upon completion of flowback,
excepting upset or emergency conditions, or with prior written
approval from the Director for necessary maintenance
operations.
v. Storage tank pressure and fluid management.
vi. Proppant dust control. 192
Moreover, “the Director may impose site-specific conditions of approval
to ensure that anticipated impacts are mitigated to the maximum extent

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id.
Id. § 404-1:305(e)(3).
2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:604(c)(4) (2016).
Id. § 404-1:604(c)(4)(A).
Id. § 404-1:604(c)(4)(B).
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achievable.” 193 In determining whether such site-specific conditions of
approval are necessary, the Director may consider a number of potential
impacts, including but not limited to: noise, ground and surface water
protection, visual impacts associated with the placement of wells or
production of equipment, and remote stimulation operations. 194
C. Implementation of Rules Pursuant to Recommendation #20
The COGCC Rules implementing Recommendation #20 include
additions and amendments to the 300 and 600 Series of rules. Specifically,
Rule 302.c requires operators, beginning on May 1, 2016, to register with
local governments (municipal local jurisdiction and county) 195 where it has
an approved drilling unit or pending or approved Form 2 or Form 2A. 196
The operator may “register” by following the registration process set up by
the municipal local jurisdiction or county, or if there is not one, by
delivering current copies of its Form 1 and Form 1A to the Local
Government Designee (“LGD”), if applicable, or to the planning
department if there is no LGD. 197 An operator may also be requested to
submit the following information to the municipal local jurisdiction and the
COGCC’s Local Government Liaison (“LGL”): (a) a good faith estimate of
the number of wells the operator intends to drill in the local jurisdiction
over the next five years; (b) a map depicting the following items within the
local jurisdiction: existing well sites and related facilities, approved sites or
sites with a pending application under Form 2 or Form 2A, and sites
identified as part of the current drilling schedule but for which applications
have not yet been submitted; and (c) well estimates based upon information
known at the time and reasonable business judgment. 198
Conforming changes to Rule 303.b.(3)K. were made in accordance with
Rule 305A(f) as previously discussed herein. 199 Processing times for
approvals of Applications for Permit-to-Drill, Form 2s and, on an Oil and
Gas Assessment, Form 2As were detailed under Rule 303.c. Such

193. Id. § 404-1:604(c)(4)(C).
194. Id.
195. 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:302(c)(1) (2016) (“‘Municipal local jurisdiction’
means a home rule or statutory city, town, territorial charter city, or combined city and
county.”).
196. Id. § 404-1:302(c)(2).
197. Id.
198. Id. § 404-1:302(c)(3) (“Well estimates are subject to the change at any time at the
operator’s sole discretion.”).
199. See 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:303(b)(3)(K) (2016).
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processing time and procedures for hearings depend on whether the facility
proposed is a Large UMA Facility.
If the proposed facility is not a Large UMA Facility, the Director shall
approve or deny such applications within 30 days of a determination that
the application is complete. 200 If the Director has not issued a decision
within 75 days of such determination, an operator may request a hearing
before the COGCC. 201 Such hearing shall not be held until 20-days notice
and newspaper notice are provided, unless after the newspaper notice all
entitled waive the 20 day notice requirement). 202
If the proposed facility is a Large UMA Facility, and the same is
consistent with a Comprehensive Drilling Plan, or a local government
comprehensive plan that specifies locations for oil and gas facilities, the
Director shall approve or deny such applications within 90 days of
determination that the application is complete. 203 An operator may request a
hearing before the COGCC according to the following timeline: (1) if the
Form 2A identifies that the operator and local government reached an
agreement regarding the site of the proposed Large UMA Facility, the Form
2A was excepted from the Rule 305A consultation process, or the local
government waived the 305A procedures in writing or failed to timely
respond, a hearing may be requested if the Director has not issued a
decision with 90 days of determination that the application is complete; 204
or (2) if the Form 2A indicates that the operator and local government had
not reached an agreement regarding the site of the proposed Large UMA
Facility, a hearing may be requested if the Director has not issued a
decision with 120 days of determination that the application is complete. 205
Such hearing shall not be held until 20-days notice and newspaper notice
are provided, unless after the newspaper notice all entitled waive the 20 day
notice requirement). 206
Additionally, pre-application notification procedures were implemented
in Rule 305.a. similar to the procedures added under Rule 305A. With
respect to Oil and Gas Locations proposed within an UMA or within the
Buffer Zone Setback, an Operator must provide a notice of intent to
conduct oil and gas operations (also “Notice”) not less than thirty days prior
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id. § 404-1:303(c)(1).
Id. § 404-1:303(c)(2)(A).
Id. § 404-1:303(c)(3).
Id. § 404-1:303(c)(1).
Id. § 404-1:303(c)(2)(B)(i).
Id. § 404-1:303(c)(2)(B)(ii).
Id. § 404-1:303(c)(3).
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to submitting a Form 2A to the Director. 207 For Oil and Gas Locations
within an UMA, the operator must provide Notice to the local government,
either through the LGD or the planning department. 208 Such Notice shall
include “a general description of the proposed Oil and Gas Facilities, the
anticipated date operations (by calendar quarter and year) will commence,
and that an additional notice pursuant to Rule 305.c. will be sent by the
Operator.” 209 This Notice will “serve as an invitation to the local
government to engage in discussions with the Operator regarding proposed
operations and timing, local government jurisdiction requirements, and
opportunities to collaborate regarding site development.” 210 Notably, this
Notice requirement does not apply if the local government received Notice
and accepted the offer to consult with the operator pursuant to Rule
305A.a. 211
In the case of a Large UMA Facility, the operator must notify any homerule or statutory city, town, territorial charter city, combined city and
county, or county (known herein as “Proximate Local Governments” or
“PGL”) within 1,000 feet of the proposed site. 212 Such Notice shall be
provided not less than forty-five days prior to submitting a Form 2A. 213
Local governments may waive their right to receive this notice at any time
when such waiver is given to the Director and the operator in writing. 214
This Notice shall include the following information: “the operator’s contact
information; a description of the location and a general description of the
proposed Large UMA Facility; and state that the [PGL] may provide
comments as provided in Rule 305.d.” 215 If the PGL provides comments
pertaining to “specific best management practices reasonably related to
potential significant adverse impacts to public health, safety and welfare,”
the Director shall respond to the same in writing. 216
Rule 305.d. identifies the comment period for Large UMA Facilities and
non-Large UMA Facilities. The comment period for a Form 2 or Form 2A
for an Oil and Gas Location that is not a Large UMA Facility is twenty

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:305(a) (2016).
Id. § 404-1:305(a)(1).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 404-1:305(a)(3)
Id.
Id.
Id. § 404-1:305(a)(3)(A).
Id. § 404-1:305(a)(3)(B).
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days from posting pursuant to Rule 305.b. 217 For a Large UMA Facility, the
comment period is forty days from posting. 218 The Director may extend or
re-open either comment period in his sole discretion for no more than
twenty days. 219
Additional consultation with the Colorado Department of Public Health
and Environment (“Department”) is also provided for in Rule 306.d.(1).
The COGCC shall consult with the Department in three circumstances: (1)
if the LGD requests the Department’s participation in the COGCC’s
consideration of an application within fourteen days of notification pursuant
to Rule 305; 220 (2) if the operator seeks a variance from a provision of
Rules 317B, 325, 603, 604, 608, 805, 900-Series or 1002.f, or consultation
is otherwise permitted or required under those rules; 221 or (3) the operator
submits a Form 1A for a Large UMA Facility. 222
Finally, Rule 604.b.(1) allows the Director to grant an exception to the
setback distance requirements provided in Rule 604 within a Designated
Setback Location if a Well or Production Facility is proposed within an
existing or approved Oil and Gas Location. 223 The Director may grant such
an exception if he determines that “alternative locations outside the
applicable setback are technically or economically impracticable, mitigation
measures imposed in the Form 2 or Form 2A will eliminate, minimize or
mitigate noise, odors, light, dust, and similar nuisance conditions to the
extend reasonably achievable; the operator has complied with the notice
and consultation requirements of Rule 305A, if applicable; the proposed
location complies with all other safety requirements of these Commission
Rules; and (a) an existing or approved Oil and Gas Location is within the
Designated Setback Location solely as a result of the adoption of Rule
604.a., above, which established Designated Setback Locations, or (b) the
Oil and Gas Location is within a Designated Setback Location solely as a
217. Id. § 404-1:305(d)(1). If the LGD, Colorado Department of Public Health and
Environment, Colorado Parks and Wildlife, Surface Owner or any owner of surface property
who received Notice requests an extension in writing, the Director shall extend the comment
period to thirty (30) days. Id. § 404-1:305(d)(1)(A). If the Oil and Gas Location is within an
UMA or within 500 feet of a building, the comment period shall be extended to no more
than forty days if requested in writing by the LGD within the original twenty-day period. Id.
§ 404-1:305(d)(1)(B).
218. Id. § 404-1:305(d)(2).
219. Id. § 404-1:305(d)(3)
220. 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:306(d)(1)(A)(i) (2016)
221. § 404-1:306(d)(1)(A)(ii).
222. § 404-1:306(d)(1)(A)(iii).
223. 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:604(b)(1) (2016).
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result of Building Units Constructed after the Oil and Gas Location was
approved by the Director.” 224
V. Ballot Initiatives
Section 1(1) of Article 5, the Colorado Constitution reserves to the
people of Colorado “the power to propose laws and amendments to the
constitution and to enact or reject them at the polls independent of the
general assembly . . . .” As noted above, during 2016 voters submitted a
number of proposed initiatives directed at oil and gas industry. Four of
these initiatives advanced to the point of having titles set and the form of
voter petitions approved. Each of these initiatives essentially proposed to
overrule Colorado Supreme Court’s state preemption holdings in the City of
Longmont and City of Fort Collins cases discussed above.
Proposed Ballot Initiative #40 would have recognized “an inherent and
inalienable right of local community self-government in each county, city,
town and other municipality” to use “prohibitions and other means” to
protect the health, safety and welfare of “natural persons” as opposed to
corporations or other business entities. 225 In contrast, proposed Ballot
Initiative #63 would have empowered citizens, by pursuing lawsuits, and
local governments, by enacting ordinances which would not have been
preempted by contrary state laws, to seek to enforce the “inherent,
indefeasible, and inalienable right” of natural persons “to a healthy
environment.” 226 The proponents of Ballot Initiatives #40 and #63 failed to
return any signatures to the Colorado Secretary of State, so these measures
will not be on the November 2016 ballot. 227
Ballot Initiative #75 proposed to expressly grant to local governments,
“without risk of state preemption,” the authority “to prevent or mitigate
detrimental impacts on public health, safety and welfare, and the
environment” by imposing “restrictions on oil and gas development.” 228
Proposed Ballot Initiative #78 took a different approach. It would have
required oil and gas wells and other facilities to be located at least 2,560
feet from an “occupied structure or areas of special concern,” defined as
“public and community drinking water sources, lakes, rivers, perennial or
224. Id.
225. See 2015-2016 Proposed Initiatives, http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/
Initiatives/timeline/2015-2016InitiativesTimeline.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2016).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
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intermittent streams, creeks, irrigation canals, riparian areas, playgrounds,
permanent sports fields, amphitheaters, public parks and public open
space.” 229 On August 8, 2016, proponents of these measures submitted
signatures to the Colorado Secretary of State in support of these two
measures. 230 On August 29, 2016, the Colorado Secretary of State
announced that random sampling required by state law had revealed that
these petitions had failed to garner the minimum number of signatures
required to be placed on the November 2016 ballot. 231 Voters have until
September 28, 2016, within which to file a lawsuit in Denver District Court
challenging the Colorado Secretary of State’s determination. 232

229.
230.
231.
232.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2016

